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CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION 731(a): DENIAL OF PRIVATE
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM AIR
POLLUTION
Section 731(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure pro-
vides:
Whenever any city, city and county, or county shall have established
zones or districts under authority of law wherein certain manu-
facturing or commercial or airport uses are expressly permitted,
except in an action to abate a public nuisance brought in the name
of the people of the State of California, no person or persons, firm or
corporation shall be enjoined or restrained by the injunctive proc-
ess from the reasonable and necessary operation in any such in-
dustrial or commercial zone or airport of any use expressly per-
mitted therein, nor shall such use be deemed a nuisance without evi-
dence of the employment of unnecessary and injurious methods of
operation. Nothing in this act shall be deemed to apply to the regu-
lation and working hours of canneries, fertilizing plants, refineries
and other similar establishments whose operation produce offensive
odors.1
This section has effectively prevented the issuance of injunctions in
private actions against nuisance-creating commercial enterprises whose
activities are protected by the zoning ordinances of their localities. As
long as the enterprise adheres to the provisions of the zoning regula-
tion, the adjoining landowners can, at most, collect damages; no in-
junction, however, will issue against the offending activity. It is the
thesis of this Note that section 731(a) should be repealed. Private in-
junctive relief would not only serve the interests of the private plaintiff,
but also would further the solution of the larger problem of air pollu-
tion. Before examining section 731(a) in detail, it is appropriate
to discuss briefly the scope and extent of the air pollution problem.
The Effects of Air Pollution and Methods of Control
A. Nature of Air Pollution
Although air pollution has been recognized as a problem for cen-
turies,2 its adverse effects have recently reached significant proportions
1. CAL. CoDn Crv. Poc. § 731(a).
2. In England, attempts to control air pollution have been made since 1300 and
have included penalties of torture and death for polluters. See H. LEWIs, WITH
EvaER BREATH You TAxa 16-20 (1965) (hereinafter cited as LEwIs].
n the United States.8 Air pollution is not only damaging to plant and
inimal life,4 but it is now producing such far-reaching effects as in-
.erference with hemispheric weather patterns.5 The loss to agriculture
as a result of contaminated air has been extensive in recent years and
is rapidly increasing;6 advanced industrial processes are emitting new
contaminants which cause more extensive damage to plant life than
the pollutants that have been discharged into the atmosphere in the
past.' The economic loss to property has been estimated to be $11
billion annually,8 which estimate does not include the social costs and
the permanent effects that such losses may have upon this nation.
A great deal of nonagricultural property loss is also attributable to
air pollution. Not only does air pollution offend the senses of residents
in urban areas, but also it has been found to injure trees and other
nonagricultural vegetation,9 to speed the corrosion of metals"0 and to
increase the rate of deterioration of rubber, building stone and other
materials. 1 Of course, California has not escaped the ill effects of air
pollution. With the rapid technological advancement over the last three
decades, California has become a highly industrialized state with many
resulting problems. Air pollution in California is no longer confined to
industrial areas but instead circulates over the state, inflicting the entire
population and habitat with its detrimental effects.. 2
Thus, the present dimensions of air pollution are far-reaching and
severe. 1 Moreover, there is reason to believe that the problem will in-
3. Four out of five Americans feel air pollution is the most important of all
environmental problems facing the nation. TIME, Feb. 2, 1970, at 56-63. See generally
Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Committee on Public Works, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on Air Pollution]; E. Cassell, The Health Effects of Air Pollution and Their Implica-
tions for Control. 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CASSELL].
4. Anderson, Effects of Air Contamination on Health, in THE POLLUIMON
READER 142, 145 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Anderson]; Hearings on Air Pollution
supra note 3, at 416-421.
5. Hearings on Air Pollution, supra note 3, at 425; James, Changing Climate,
Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
6. See generally Comment, Agricultural Pesticides: The Need for Improved Con-
trol Legislation, 52 MiNN. L. REV. 1242 (1968).
7. Some of these contaminants have affected vegetation more than 100 miles
from their point of origin. Hearings on Air Pollution, supra note 3, at 421.
8. Id. at 423.
9. Id. at 421-22. In the San Bernardino National Forest near Los Angeles,
1,000 acres of ponderosa pines have been fatally afflicted by smog from the city.
N.Y. Times, April 2, 1970, at 16, cols. 1-3.
10. Hearings on Air Pollution, supra note 3, at 423.
11. Id.
12. See note 7 supra. See also Cassell, supra note 3.
13. The Public Health Service has recently called the air pollution affecting
43 million people a major problem. LEwis, supra note 2, at 2.
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crease in magnitude. The ever-increasing demand for new and more
consumer goods, the population explosion and the resultant increase in
industrial production will cause the types and quantity of contaminants
in the air to increase drastically unless the problem is successfully at-
tacked.14  A substantial reduction in the amount of pollutants being
discharged is technologically feasible, 15 but forcing industry to adopt
advanced control devices and methods of production is a difficult task.
With the exception of nuisance actions brought by private plaintiffs,"0
virtually all of the recent attempts to deal with industrial air pollution
have been in the form of regulatory statutes, ordinances or administra-
tive rulings.
B. California Control and Abatement Procedures
The California Legislature has recognized the problem of air pol-
lution and has provided for its abatement by enacting two regulatory
systems. The first was the Air Pollution Control Act of 194718 which
provides for the establishment of air pollution control districts. Under
this act a county may create an air pollution control district pursuant
to a proper resolution by the board of supervisors.' 9 After such a reso-
lution, the county board of supervisors then becomes the air pollution
control board of the district and is authorized to make orders, rules and
regulations to reduce the amount of air contaminants released within the
county whenever it determines that the air in the district "is so polluted
as to cause any discomfort or property damage at intervals to a substan-
tial number of inhabitants ... 20
14. Hearings on Air Pollution, supra note 3, at 410; See also LEwis, supra
note 1, at 1-8.
15. See generally Ludwig, Air Pollution Control Technology: Research and
Development On New and Improved Systems, 33 LAw & CoNTEMr. PROB. 217 (1968).
16. E.g., Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d
548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964); Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265,
288 P.2d 507 (1955); Christopher v. Jones, 231 Cal. App. 2d 408, 41 Cal. Rptr. 828
(1964); Roberts v. Permanente Corp., 188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 10 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961).
17. See Havighurst, Foreword to Symposium on Air Pollution Control, 33 LAw.
& CoNTEMp. PROB. 195 (1968).
18. Cal. Stat. (1947), ch. 632, at 1640; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24198-
323 (1953).
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 24202 provides: "An air pollution control
district shall not transact any business or exercise any of its powers under this chapter
until or unless the board of supervisors of the county in which it is situated, by
proper resolution, declares at any time hereafter that there is need for an air pollution
control district to function in such county."
20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24262 provides: "Whenever the air pollution
control board finds that the air in the air pollution control district is so polluted as to
cause any discomfort or property damage at intervals to a substantial number of in-
May 1971] 1403
The second regulatory scheme enacted to abate air pollution was
the Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act of 1967.21 Under this act the
legislature has created the Air Resources Board to provide "a single
state agency for administration, research, establishment of standards and
the coordination of air conservation activities carried on within the
state."' 22 To carry out its function, the board is empowered to establish
ambient air quality standards that can vary throughout the state. 3
In spite of California's attempt to abate pollution, there is a need
for still more effective control. The present statutory regulations do not
provide an adequate means of controlling pollution in all cases. 24  Gov-
ernmental regulations are ineffective in many instances because of the
inability of regulatory agencies to enforce antipollution statutes and the
inflexible nature of the statutory regulation itself.25 Both the Air Re-
sources Board and the air pollution control districts operate on a low
budget,26 with a lack of trained personnel 27 and with weak enforce-
ment powers.28 As a result of these administrative deficiencies, en-
habitants of the district, the air pollution control board may make and enforce
such orders, rules, and regulations as will reduce the amount of air contaminants re-
leased within the district."
21. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1545, § 5; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39000-570.
22. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39013 provides: "It is imperative to pro-
vide a single state agency for administration, research, establishment of standards, and
the coordination of air conservation activities carried on within the state."
23. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39051 provides: "The board shall after
holding public hearings: (a) Divide the state into basins to fulfill the purposes of
this division not later than January 1, 1969. (b) Adopt standards of ambient air
quality for each basin in consideration of the public health, safety and welfare, in-
cluding but not limited to health, illness, irritation to the senses, aesthetic value, inter-
ference with visibility, and effects on the economy. These standards may vary from
one basin to another. Standards relating to health effects shall be based upon the
recommendations of the State Department of Public Health ....
24. In commenting on the many recently filed environmental suits, Professor
Joseph L. Sax stated that "''[ilf there's a theme to all these suits, it's an attempt to
circumvent relatively ineffective regulatory agencies.'" Conti, Cleaning Up In Court,
Wall St. J., March 26, 1970, at 1, col. 6. It has been suggested that much of the recent
emphasis on environmental conditions is only rhetoric and that no real effort will be
put forth by the government. See, e.g., Kenworthy, Nixon's Pollution Policy, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1970, at 42, col. 1. See also Hagevik, Legislating For Air Quality
Management: Reducing Theory to Practice, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 369 (1968);
[hereinafter cited as Hagevik]; Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the
Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126.
25. See Hagevik, supra note 24, at 369.
26. "The Air Resources Board is grossly under-funded for the work that must be
done." STATE OF CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STUDY COUNCIL, PROGRESS
REPORT 38 (1970).
27. "The lack of technically trained people to man the State and local air pollu-
tion programs presents difficulties in implementing these programs." Id. at 36.
28. See text accompanying note 29 infra. See also Hill, Air Pollution grows
Despite Rising Public Alarm, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1969, at 61, col. 2-3.
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forcement of prescribed standards must be selective and is unlikely to
be directed at small, sporadic or nonflagrant violations. The inability
to enforce air quality standards can be expected to increase as the num-
ber of violations become more numerous and understaffed agencies are
forced to control only the most culpable polluters. Also, the lack of
enforcement powers in the state agencies continues to impair the effi-
ciency of air pollution control. In a recent progress report on the effi-
cacy of air pollution control statutes, the Environmental Quality Study
Council stated:
The Air Resources Board has divided the State into air basins and
set air quality standards for the State as a whole; however, both
the basins and the air quality standards are meaningless because the
Mulford-Carrell Act did not give the Air Resources Board authority
to do 'anything futher in meeting the standards.29
The inability of state agencies to abate pollution is further illustrated by
the nonexistence of air pollution control districts in many areas of the
state.3 0 Since the establishment of such a district is discretionary with
the board of supervisors of each county,3 it can be expected that
counties without a responsive board of supervisors will have virtually
no pollution abatement procedures. Moreover, the Air Resources
Board is presently only a part-time agency3 2 with power to act solely
in situations where the local authorities have failed to take action.33
Even if agencies were able to enforce the existing statutes properly,
there would still be instances in which the statute was not adequate to
solve the problem. No legislative enactment, especially in a new prob-
lem area, can hope to redress all current grievances. There will always
be gaps in legislation because of the legislature's inability to foresee all
possible situations or because of the inflexibility inherent in the stat-
utes.3 4 For example, the California statutes exempt agricultural opera-
29. STATE OF CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STUDY COUNCIL, PROGRESS
REPORT 35 (1970).
30. "Many areas of the State have no local air pollution control districts, although
air pollution of one form or another is found everywhere, statewide. In those areas
without control districts, there is no one to establish or enforce regulations that may be
needed locally or required by the State." Id. at 33.
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24202, quoted in note 19 supra.
32. "The State Air Resources Board is, at present, a part-time board. The extent
of the air pollution problems make it appear that a full-time board may be desirable."
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STUDY CoUNcIL, PROGRESS REPORT 38
(1970).
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39012 provides: "The state authority
shall undertake enforcement activities only after it has determined that the local or
regional authorities have failed to meet their responsibilities pursuant to the provisions
of this division. Such determination shall only be made after a public hearing has
been held for that purpose."
34. For example, although the 1967 Air Quality Act authorized the Secretary of
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tions from pollution control.35 As a result, agricultural wastes have
been disposed of by burning, which is a cause of air pollution in many
areas of the state.36 Furthermore, the nature of the problem, as in the
case of odors, may be difficult to control by statutory standards.
C. Private Injunction Actions as a Supplementary Abatement
Procedure
In light of the inability of governmental control schemes to abate
air pollution, it is desirable to provide for and to permit any other
possible methods of pollution abatement. Consequently, private liti-
gants seeking injunctions to abate pollution should be allowed to sup-
plement antipollution statutes as well as vindicate their private rights.
However, it should be remembered that the overall pollution control con-
sequences of private actions are not a substitute for effective govern-
mental regulations. Although private actions can abate air pollution in
many instances, only comprehensive legislation can provide an effective
solution to the problem.
In California a private party has no standing to enjoin solely
public nuisances. With the exception of a few states,38 a private in-
dividual has no action for a purely public nuisance. But if the pollu-
tion also constitutes a private nuisance because an individual is suffering
special damages, then he will have standing to bring an action.3 9
It is clear that the public will benefit by such private litigation:
When a private person thus obtains a standing in court, by reason
of his having suffered special damages, although he can only main-
tain his suit for an injunction on that ground, yet the court grants re-
lief, not solely because the nuisance is private so far as he is con-
cerned, but because it is public, and the relief will benefit the pub-
lic. 40
HEW to establish air quality regions and air standards, very little progress has yet
been made in establishing adequate regulations. President Nixon acknowledged the
problem in his message to Congress on pollution; however, comprehensive legislation
seems a long way off. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1970, at 32, col. 1.
35. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24360.2.
36. STATE OF CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STUDY COUNCIL, PROGRESS
REPORT 36 (1970).
37. CAL. CIr. CODE § 3493 provides: "A private person may maintain an ac-
tion for a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself, but not otherwise."
38. Recently some states have recognized the advantage of permitting private
individuals to bring suits against private as well as public nuisances and have enacted
statutes specifically authorizing such suits. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 280.02 (1958);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05 (1969).
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3493, quoted in note 37 supra.
40. Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co., 18 F. 753, 788-89 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1884).
1406 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
PRIVATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
As long as the assertion of private rights seeking injunctive relief does not
interfere with public control regulations, it seems clearly desirable to
preserve these rights. The issuances of private injunctions can compen-
sate for the inadequacies of government regulation while simultan-
eously protecting the rights of plaintiffs to the use of their property.
First, private injunction actions may be used to abate nuisances caused
by types of pollution that simply are not covered by existing statutes.41
Private control of such nuisances is a necessity for the individual land-
owner as well as the other members of the community who are affected
by a polluting industry which is not subject to any governmental con-
trol. In this instance, private injunctive relief is the only means by
which pollution can be controlled and, even if an injunction is ulti-
mately not granted, the threat of possible success in court will perhaps
discourage industries from polluting indiscriminately without making
an attempt to control their operation.
Second, private injunction actions may serve to abate pollution
when government agencies are not enforcing the statutes effectively.
This purpose is particularly compelling in areas where the problem of air
pollution has become so severe because of nunierous violations that
all violators cannot be compelled to comply with the statutory stand-
ards. Thus, private suits can provide a means for attacking pollution
violations that are ignored by governmental agencies, either because
those agencies are too overburdened with work to prosecute all of-
fenders, or because the particular pollutant discharges are considered
too insignificant to warrant official attention. For example, there
may be an instance of pollution that is relatively minor in comparison
with the emissions of major polluters, but which is nevertheless injuri-
ous to persons residing in the area affected by the pollution. In such
cases, overworked governmental agencies may not consider it appropri-
ate to exercise their authority to abate the nuisance.42 The availability
of private injunctive relief in such a case would provide the aggrieved
residents with a means of redress for the injuries they suffer. More-
over, such private actions would help to enforce governmental policy
and would relieve some of the burden on governmental agencies. 43 The
lack of diligent enforcement of statutory regulations may also be the re-
sult of apathetic agencies which are making no real effort to abate
pollution. Private injunctive relief would once again supplement the
agencies' functions in this situation.
Private injunction actions may also serve a significant purpose even
41. E.g., see note 34 supra.
42. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
43. E.g., see note 38 supra for states which have recognized the advantage of
private actions as a supplement to governmental control.
May 19711
when the antipollution statutes are being enforced. In some cases ac-
tions brought by private suits may be preferable to administrative en-
forcement of inflexible statutory regulations.44 One objection to direct
statutory regulation is that it results in considerably higher costs than
would selective pollution abatement. The Federal Coordinating Com-
mittee on the Economic Impact of Pollution Abatement suggests that
the cost of achieving a specific air quality standard could increase by
200 to 400 percent if all polluters were forced to comply with the same
statutory standard rather than with a selective abatement scheme.4"
Another writer fears that if a solely regulatory approach were applied
to air pollution abatement, an inflexible set of quality standards would
become entrenched in the law, thus impeding the adoption of improved
antipollution technology in industries.46 As the extent of pollution
increases, and as technology becomes more advanced, it will be neces-
sary to adjust the standards of industrial pollution permissible on a case-
by-case basis. In some instances an industry may be complying with
the statutory standards and yet be able to reduce its emissions sub-
stantially; in this situation, a court of equity could impose a stricter
standard suitable to the particular industry.4" The ability of the courts
to take all of the circumstances of each particular case into account and
to shape the remedies in light of those circumstances leads to the con-
clusion that the courts are able to provide a more flexible solution to
individual problems than is a statutory regulation.
48
Enactment of Section 731(a) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure
A. California and Private Injunctive Relief
The common law and a majority of jurisdictions in the United
States have recognized the need and provided for private injunctive re-
lief from nuisances since the earlier part of the eighteenth century.49
44. See Hagevik, supra note 24, at 377.
45. Id.
46. Anderson, supra note 4, at 158.
47. It would be wishful thinking to expect industries voluntarily to adopt new
technology. See LEWIS, supra note 2, at 252-53.
48. Professor Cassell suggests that it may be necessary to permit both private and
public nuisance actions if air pollution abatement is to be effective. Cassell, supra
note 3. Other writers have also reached the conclusion that private litigants have an
active role to play in the abatement of air pollution. Jurgensmeyer, Control of Air
Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126; Miller and
Borchers, Private Lawsuits and Air Pollution, 56 A.B.A.J. 465 (1970); Porter, The Role
of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air Pollution, 10 ARiz. L.R. 107 (1968).
49. See Baines v. Baker, 27 Eng. Rep. 105 (Ex. 1752); DeFuniak, Equitable
Relief Against Nuisances, 38 KY. L.J. 223 (1950).
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However, most courts limit the availability of private injunctive re-
lief by "balancing the equities" between property owners who have con-
flicting rights of use of their property. The balancing of equities doc-
trine takes into account both the relative economic hardship which will
result to the parties from the granting or denial of the injunction and the
interest of the general public in the continuation of the polluting enter-
prise. 0 If the defendant's conduct is more beneficial than detrimental to
society, the operation generally will not be enjoined. Because society, as
well as the interest of the parties, is considered, this policy of the vast ma-
jority of courts to balance the equities in a nuisance action produces the
most desirable result in terms of achieving the greatest good for the
greatest number. Damages, however, will usually be granted to the
aggrieved plaintiff who cannot obtain an injunction.
California has also provided for private injunctive relief from nui-
sances since its earliest years. 5 ' The California position, however, de-
veloped from the statutory provision, enacted in 1872, that land oc-
cupants have the right to be free from unreasonable interferences with
the use and enjoyment of their property by enjoining, abating and re-
covering damages for such interferences which constitute nuisances. 52
The California courts interpreted these enactments strictly, affording
aggrieved property owners a striking amount of protection from nui-
sances. Once a nuisance was established, the courts would grant dam-
ages and an injunction preventing the continuation of the nuisance
without balancing the equities between the parties to the action.
In Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co.,53 for example, the
trial court granted an injunction as well as damages to a relatively
small farmer against a large cement plant for the nuisance created
by the plant's dust emissions.5" On appeal, the defendant urged the
court to balance the equities, contending that damages were adequate
to compensate plaintiff for his loss, but that it was doing everything
possible to keep the dust from being discharged and that an injunction
would place an undue burden upon the defendant and community since
the plant employed over five hundred people.55 After discussing nu-
50. See text accompanying note 78 infra.
51. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 731 provides: "An action may be brought by any
person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened
by a nuisance, as the same is defined in section thirty-four hundred and seventy-nine of
the Civil Code, and by the judgment in such action the nuisance may be enjoined or
abated as well as damages recovered therefore.
52. Id.
53. 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
54. Id. at 242, 118 P. 931.
55. Id. at 246, 118 P. at 931.
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merous balancing of equities cases,5" the Supreme Court of California
affirmed the decision, rejecting the defendant's contention. In refusing
to apply the balancing of equities doctrine, the court stated:
Of course great interests should not be overthrown on trifling or
frivolous grounds, as where the maxim de mininis non curat lex
is applicable; but every substantial, material right of person or prop-
erty is entitled to protection against all the world. It is by protect-
ing the most humble in his small estate against the encroachments
of large capital and large interests that the poor man is ultimately en-
abled to become a capitalist himself. If the smaller interests must
yield to the larger, all small property rights, and all small and less
important enterprises, industries, and pursuits would sooner or
later be absorbed by the large, more powerful few; and their de-
velopment to a condition of great value and importance, both to
the individual and the public, would be arrested in its incipiency. 57
The refusal of the California courts to adopt the balancing of
equities doctrine is again exemplified in Judson v. Los Angeles Sub-
urban Gas Co.,58 in which a natural gas factory was enjoined from
creating a nuisance. The plant was operating under municipal permis-
sion to furnish gas; there was no proof that plaintiff's land was de-
preciated nor that his health was injuriously affected by the operation
of defendant's gasworks. Yet, both damages and an injunction were
awarded to the plaintiff, a local resident, for the interference with his
comfortable enjoyment of property. On appeal, the supreme court af-
firmed the decision enjoining the plant from operating in such a manner
as to cause smoke or gases to be precipitated upon the property of the
plaintiff. The court, in refusing to balance the equities, held that a
business may not act to the detriment of others "even when operating
under municipal permission or under public obligation to furnish a com-
modity." 9
This policy was again enunciated in Vowinckel v. N. Clark &
Sons,6" wherein a large industry operating in a heavy industrial zone
was enjoined by a plaintiff living in a residential area adjoining the
commercial zone. Citing the Hulbert and Judson cases, the court held
that an injunction will not be denied on the basis "that the injury suf-
fered by the defendant will be greater, if the injunction be granted, than
the injury suffered by the plaintiff if the injunction be refused."61  The
56. E.g., Dillworth's Appeal, 91 Pa. 248 (1879); Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa.
102, 10 Am. Rep. 669 (1872); Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 98 Am. Dec. 202 (1868).
57. 161 Cal. at 251, 118 P. at 933, quoting Woodruff v. North Bloomfield
Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 807 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
58. 157 Cal. 168, 106 P. 581 (1910).
59. Id. at 173, 106 P. at 583.
60. 216 Cal. 156, 13 P.2d 733 (1932).
61. Id. at 163, 13 P.2d at 736.
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court went on to say that the authorization of an industry by a munici-
pality did not bar an injunction.62
B. Section 731(a) and its Effect
In 1935 the California Legislature enacted section 731(a) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure.68 As demonstrated by the forego-
ing cases,
[p]rior to the addition of that section. . . the law was well settled
that a person could enjoin certain conduct as a nuisance even though
the business was conducted in a district zoned to permit business of
the type of which complaint was made and defendant was mak-
ing an effort to operate his business in a careful and efficient man-
ner.
64
The law was not furthering the interest of society to achieve industrial
expansion at a time when it was necessary for the revitalization of the
American economy. The Great Depression had recently culminated,
and the economy was still suffering from its devastating effects. In
light of the existing law and economic conditions, it was essential to
protect and promote industrial growth. Consequently, the enactment of
section 731(a) for the purpose of eliminating "injunctive relief where
the business is operated in its appropriate zone and the only showing
is an injury and nuisance to the plaintiff in such operation ' '65 was an
appropriate measure.
The courts have consistently allowed industries to assert section 731
(a) as a defense when private parties seek injunctive relief from nui-
sances.66 In the typical case an industry operating in an appropriately
zoned area cannot be enjoined' even though its operation is creating a
nuisance. The restrictive effect that section 731(a) has had upon
the availability of private injunctive relief can be demonstrated by con-
trasting the recent case of Roberts v. Permanente Corporation67 with
62. Id. at 164, 13 P.2d at 737.
63. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 511, § 1, at 1584.
64. Gelfand v. O'Haver, 33 Cal. 2d 218, 220, 200 P.2d 790, 791 (1948).
65. Id. The purpose for which section 731(a), was enacted was stated in Mullally
v. Ojai Hotel Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 9, 11, 71 Cal. Rptr. 882, 884 (1968), as follows:
"[W]e think that it is perfectly clear that the entire intent of the section is to prevent
certain nuisance actions permitted by the courts before the section was enacted in
1935. . ....
66. Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d
548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964); Komoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265,
288 P.2d 507 (1955); Roberts v. Permanente Corp., 188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 519 (1961); Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 203 P.2d 37 (1949);
North Side Property Owners' Assn. v. Hillside Memorial Park, 70 Cal. App. 2d 609,
161 P.2d 618 (1945); McNeill v. Redington, 67 Cal. App. 2d 315, 154 P.2d 428 (1944).
67. 188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 10 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961).
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the Hulbert6 8 case, decided prior to the enactment of section 731(a).
The facts of the two cases are similar. In Hulbert an injunction and sup-
plementary damages were granted to a small farmer against a
cement plant for the nuisance created from dust settling upon plain-
tiff's land. Roberts also involved a cement plant whose dust emissions
had created a nuisance rendering a local resident's home uninhabitable;
however, an injunction was denied since section 731 (a) was held to be
a valid defense. Although the plaintiff was allowed to recover dam-
ages on a second count for trespass, 69 he was forced to endure the con-
tinuation of the nuisance, the abatement of which had been his primary
concern.
Again, in Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co.,70 damages were
awarded to the plaintiff for the unreasonable interference with the use
and enjoyment of his property by the operation of defendant's cotton gin-
ning mill, but an injunction was denied. During the ginning season,
which lasts approximately 6 months of each year, defendant's mill
was emitting into the atmosphere large quantities of fumes, vapors,
dust, sediment and other waste materials which settled upon plaintiff's
home and person. The court, allowing damages for the trespass and
nuisance, observed that "defendant's ginning mill is lawfully operated
in a location properly zoned therefor and need not, or may not. . . be
abated."'1
Although section 731 (a) has accomplished the legislature's goal of
limiting the availability of private injunctive relief, it also prevents pollu-
tion abatement by private injunction actions. In 1935, when the statute
was passed, the failure of the section to provide for pollution control was
insignificant, as air pollution was not a problem. Today, however,
the deterioration of the environment 72 has made it clear that legislation
which restricts private injunctive relief should be modified or repealed.
There is no longer a need for section 731(a). The industrial com-
plex in California has developed to the degree where a protectionist
policy is not necessary. Instead, the social interest in a clean and
healthy environment must be protected from the ever-expanding in-
dustrial sector. Furthermore, in the past 20 years the California courts
have applied the balancing of equities doctrine in nuisance actions. 3
68. Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 151 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
69. Initially the trial court denied an injunction as well as damages, but the
appellate court reversed the holding as to the latter.
70. 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d 507 (1955).
71. Id. at 271, 288 P.2d at 511, citing CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 73 1(a).
72. See text accompanying notes 2-17 supra.
73. Lomas Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548.
39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964): "[An injunction will be granted only when such a remedy
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This change is significant because the refusal of the courts to balance
the equities in cases such as Hulbert,74 Judson,75 and Vowinckel76 was
the very reason section 731(a) was enacted. Thus, now that the rea-
son for which section 731(a) was enacted has ceased to exist, so also
should the law cease. 77 This conclusion is particularly compelling when
the balancing of equities doctrine is compared with section 731 (a) as
a method of adjudicating nuisance actions.
Under the balancing of equities doctrine, the courts determine
whether an injunction should be granted by considering the circum-
stances and exigencies of the case at bar. The court may take into con-
sideration the relative economic hardship which the parties will suffer
from the granting or denial of the injunction, the good faith or inten-
tional misconduct of each, and the interest of society in the enterprise.
78
Thus, in deciding whether injunctive relief is appropriate, the court will
give due weight to all the factors of each case to arrive at an equitable
solution. Equitable relief for private litigants is particularly suit-
able to the present needs of society, because the courts could strike a bal-
ance between the conflicting social goals in the abatement of pollution
and the enjoyment of the fruits of industrialization. In contrast, section
731(a) only permits the courts to determine whether an industry is
complying with zoning ordinances.
Zoning regulations may be enforced only by the governmental
entity which has enacted them; air pollution, however, is not con-
fined by such artificial boundaries. California now has a vast indus-
trial complex which is emitting intolerable amounts of pollutants into the
atmosphere. 79 They are now emitted in such quantity and are so widely
distributed that their effects are being felt by the public at large and
not merely by property owners adjacent to the polluting industries.
Indeed, air pollutants may be carried by the elements to such distances
is appropriate, and in determining the availability of injunctive relief, the court must
consider the interests of third persons and of the general public." Id. at 588, 394 P.2d
at 552, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 712; Baglione v. Leue, 160 Cal. App. 2d 731, 325 P.2d 471
(1958); Christensen v. Tucker, 114 Cal. App. 2d 544, 250 P.2d 660 (1952). See 2
B. WrrniN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES §§ 73-75 (1970).
74. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
77. Cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex. Reason is the soul of the law, when
the reason for a law ceases, so should the law itself.
78. Injunctive relief is appropriate when there is a showing of irreparable injury
for which there is no other adequate remedy. See generally 2 B. WiTrKN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES § 49 (1970); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TnE LAW
OF ToRTs 624-25 (3d ed. 1964).
79. See text accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
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as to create nuisances in different municipalities and states8 0 The
federal government has recognized the problem of long-distance
circulation of air pollutants in the Air Quality Act of 196781 and has
provided an administrative procedure for abating interstate pollution.82
But the procedure available has been criticized as "an outstanding ex-
ample of wretched draftmanship" by the Chairman of the Missouri Air
Conservation Commission because of the lack of effective emission stand-
ards and the time-consuming abatement procedures which may require
from 3 to 10 years.83
It is true that section 731(a) permits a landowner to recover dam-
ages from a polluting neighbor. However, "[i]t is evident that to leave
property owners to an action in damages would, in many cases, de-
prive them of any effective remedy whatsoever.""4 Recovery of damages
usually will not prevent the continuation of the nuisance; the plaintiff,
despite his recovery at law, will continue to suffer inestimable health
and property effects."8 Furthermore, there are technical obstacles in-
herent in the determination of the extent of liability in nuisance actions.
Not only is it difficult to discover the amount of the plaintiff's damages,
it is even a greater task to adjudicate the extent of the defendant's lia-
bility, for it is often the case that there are several sources of pollution.
Even if these obstacles are surmounted, it may not be wise for the
plaintiff to attempt to deter a defendant's operation by bringing succes-
sive suits. If a court holds that the nuisance is permanent, then any
prior litigation will be res judicata in regard to the amount of damages
recoverable, and plaintiff will be barred from recovering subsequent
damages .8  Once the landowner has recovered, he has no legal recourse
to combat the cumulative effects of pollution. Finally, it will be impos-
sible for everyone adversely affected to recover damages since the
pollutants may circulate over vast areas.8 7
80. See generally Green, State Control of Interstate Air Pollution, 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 315 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Green].
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-57(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
82. The Secretary of HEW is empowered to prescribe air quality standards and
"recommended" control techniques for the abatement of such pollution. Green, supra
note 80, at 317-19.
83. Id. at 320.
84. Mullally v. Ojai Hotel Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 9, 12, 71 Cal. Rptr. 882, 884
(1968).
85. Money damages do occasionally deter commercial enterprises from discharg-
ing pollutants into the environment, but they do not abate such discharges in most
cases, for it may be less expensive for an industry to reimburse complainants than to
prevent the discharges. See Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through The
Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126.
86. See Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 268-70, 288 P.2d
507, 509-10 (1955); Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 864, 137 P.2d 713 (1943).
87. The aggregate accumulation of pollutants from many sources can have far-
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An illustration of the unfortunate social effects of section 731 (a)
may be found in Wheeler v. Gregg,"" wherein twenty-six plaintiffs
sought to enjoin a rock quarry and plant from commencing operations
in a residential area. The court denied injunctive relief on the ground
that the defendant was operating the rock quarry pursuant to a con-
ditional use permit and was thus protected by section 731(a). Once
the court determined that section 731(a) authorized operation of the
rock quarry, it did not consider the circumstances which were detri-
mental to the public.
On appeal, the court affirmed the decision, giving no weight to
the plaintiffs' evidence tending to show that the rock quarry was detri-
mental to the community welfare. The circumstances indicating the
undesirability of a rock quarry were that the area had been zoned for
residential-agricultural purposes for the previous 32 years that the city
planning commission had reaffirmed the zoning classification as a resi-
dential area and had continually denied variance applications for per-
mission to mine rocks within the area; 9 and that there were more than
360 homes, two churches, a public school, a public park and a medical
clinic in the immediate locality.90 The evidence strongly suggested that
the rock quarry was more detrimental than beneficial to the public and,
that it should have been enjoined. 1  Because the action was brought
by private plaintiffs, however, section 731(a) barred the court from
considering all of the circumstances of the case and thwarted the in-
terest of the general public in pollution control and abatement.
C. Exceptions Under Section 731(a)
1. The "Unnecessary and Injurious" Test
Although section 731(a) provides for two exceptions under
which a court of equity may enjoin commercial enterprises, the courts
have not interpreted and applied these exceptions to ameliorate
the deficiencies inherent in the section. These exceptions, however,
do offer to the courts an opportunity to fashion appropriate remedies
for aggrieved landowners. The first exception states that a commercial
enterprise may be enjoined if the plaintiff proves that the enterprise
is employing "unnecessary and injurious" methods of operation.92 In
reaching effects, as demonstrated by the destruction of 1000 acres of pine trees near
Los Angeles. See note 9 supra.
88. 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 203 P.2d 37 (1949).
89. Id. at 356, 203 P.2d at 42-43.
90. Id.
91. At least a substantial number of residents and the city planning commis-
sion thought so. Id. at 359, 203 P.2d at 45.
92. CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 731(a).
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only two instances have the California courts held that the defendant's
activity was "unnecessary and injurious." 93 In Gelfand v. O'Haver,94
where a music studio was enjoined for disturbing the neighboring resi-
dents, the defendant had made no attempt to insulate or diminish the
noise in any way. The court, in determining his operation to be "unnec-
essary and injurious," said that failure to pursue methods customarily
employed in a similar business in the vicinity tended to indicate that
the methods of operation were "unnecessary and injurious." 95  The
court further defined the standards which the defendant must meet by
quoting approvingly from the Pennsylvania case of Hannum v. Gru-
ber,96 wherein it is stated:
If devices or more efficient management which would reduce the
smoke, odors, gases, smudge and noises and vibrations issuing from
its plant are available to the defendant at a reasonable expense,
it is the duty of the defendant to secure such devices or management
and if it fails to do so, the smoke, noises, etc., emitting from its plant
may be regarded as unnecessary and unreasonable.9 7
This case lends support by analogy to the proposition that a commercial
enterprise is operating in an "unnecessary and injurious" manner if it
is not using the most efficient control devices available at a reasonable
cost. The question not answered, however, is whether a commercial
enterprise employing the most efficient antipollution devices avail-
able may nevertheless be enjoined because its manner of production is
so detrimental to the environment as to outweigh the utility of the
product.
The later case of Christopher v. Joness8 does not provide an an-
swer. The Christopher court applied the Gelfand test to find that
a chemical repackaging plant was operating in an unnecessary and
injurious manner. The decision was based upon evidence that the
plant was leaking chlorine gas onto the plaintiffs land and that a well-
maintained plant does not generally leak gas. Although the courts
apparently have unlimited discretion in applying the "unnecessary and
injurious" test, they have limited the condition to the most culpable
operations. In both of the above cases the defendants were making
no effort to prevent their operations from creating a nuisance. It is
submitted, however, that the courts could broadly interpret the "un-
necessary and injurious" clause so as to encompass many industries
93. Gelfand v. O'Haver, 33 Cal. 2d 218, 200 P.2d 790 (1948); Christopher v.
Jones, 231 Cal. App. 2d 408, 41 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1964).
94. 33 Cal. 2d 218, 200 P.2d 790 (1948).
95. Id. at 221, 200 P.2d at 792.
96. 346 Pa. 417, 31 A.2d 99 (1943).
97. Id. at 424, 31 A.2d at 103.
98. 231 Cal. App. 2d 408, 41 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1964).
1416 [Vol. 22
PRIVATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
whose emissions are creating nuisances. Such a construction would in-
crease the effectiveness of section 731(a) in controlling pollution and
thus diminish, although not eliminate, the undesirable results which
occur under the section. To achieve this effect the courts should em-
ploy the following test: If the injury to society from the pollution is
not justified by the importance and utility of the manufactured prod-
uct, then the operation should be enjoined. Under this test, an in-
dustry may be operating as efficiently as possible and still be en-
joined. This standard, although perhaps difficult to apply, would
achieve the most equitable results, for the environment would not be
thoughtlessly sacrificed upon the altar of productivity, however efficient
it may be.
2. The "Offensive Odors" Exception
The second clause which affords opportunities for circumventing
the obstacle otherwise posed by section 731(a) excepts a class of com-
mercial enterprises from the protection of the section. The concluding
sentence of the section provides that
[niothing in this act shall be deemed to apply to the regulation of
canneries, fertilizing plants, refineries, and other similar establish-
ments whose operations produce offensive odors. 99
Industries within this classification are thus subject to the general nui-
sance law of California and may be privately enjoined.
The class of enterprises which may be included within this ex-
ception as characteristically producing "offensive" odors has not been
clearly defined. One court has interpreted this exception to include
industries other than canneries, fertilizing plants and refineries.10  In
People v. A. & M. Castings, Inc.10 1 the court, in affirming a convic-
tion for polluting the atmosphere, held that a casting plant emanating
nauseating odors is within the "similar establishments" clause of section
731(a).102 Because there are no other decisions construing or limiting
this clause, the courts are free to interpret this exception liberally so as
to deny the protection of section 731(a) to industries. A. & M. Cast-
ings, which found a casting plant to be a "similar establishment," may
provide authority for judicial expansion of exceptions to section
731(a). Likewise, what constitutes "offensive odors" is a qualitative
test which is certainly subject to judicial interpretation and could be
99. California Code of Civil Procedure section 731(a) is quoted in full in the
text accompanying note 1 supra.
100. People v. A. & M. Castings, Inc., 154 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 881, 316 P.2d
779 (1957).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 883, 316 P.2d at 780.
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construed to mean an odor no matter how slight or unannoying. Thus,
any large manufacturing industry held to be a "similar establishment,"
discharging odoriferous pollutants, no matter how inoffensive, could
be subject to possible enjoinment under equitable principles.
Conclusion
The conditions under which section 731(a) was enacted have
changed drastically. California is now a highly industrialized state
with ever-increasing problems of air pollution. Air pollutants emitted
by industries now have widespread effects upon the public at large,
not merely upon property owners adjacent to the polluting industry.
State regulation of the air pollution problem, unfortunately, is not ade-
quate. Until government regulation is able to keep air contamination
within tolerable limits, it is desirable to allow private individuals to seek
injunctive relief, with the indirect result that the benefits of the injunc-
tion will inure to society at large. Section 731 (a), however, frustrates
this result by permitting courts to consider only whether an in-
dustry is operating reasonably in a properly zoned area, according to
the zoning regulations enacted by a municipality. Although this ap-
proach may be proper with respect to actions brought by residents of
the municipality whose zoning laws were enacted in their best interests,
this reasoning should not extend beyond the borders of such a restricted
legislative jurisdiction.
But for section 731(a), the courts would use the balancing of
equities doctrine to determine whether an industry should be enjoined.
Under this test the court would consider the relative economic hard-
ships which the parties would suffer from the granting or denial of the
injunction, the good faith or intentional misconduct of each and the
interest of society in the enterprise. Thus, application of this doctrine
would permit the court to evaluate the circumstances of each case;
zoning ordinances alone would not be determinative. Section 731(a)
should be repealed, thus permitting the courts to apply the balancing
of equities doctrine to actions brought to enjoin commercial enterprises
operating in appropriately zoned areas. 103 The rights of private liti-
gants could be vindicated, and, in the process, the larger problem of air
pollution would be proportionately alleviated.
Until such time as the section is repealed, the California courts should
103. Two writers have taken the opposite view, but both articles were written in
the 1950's when the effects of air pollution had not reached significant proportions.
Perhaps the authors would reach a different conclusion in light of the present environ-
mental conditions. See Steinberg, Rights Under California Law of the Individual In-
jured by Air Pollution, 27 S. CALIF. L. REV. 405 (1954); Comment, Legislative Limi-
tation on Air Pollution Enforcement, 9 HAsTINGS L.J. 191 (957).
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adopt a liberal construction of the exceptions under section 731(a). Pol-
luting industries could be placed either within the "unnecessary and
injurious" clause or within the provisions declaring "similar establish-
ments whose operations produce offensive odors" to be an exception
to the applicability of the section. As there have been no decisions
limiting the scope of either clause, the courts may exercise wide dis-
cretion in future cases in which an industry wishes to avail itself of
the defense afforded by the section.
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